From: Amon Ott <ao@rsbac.org>
Subject: Re: Unix secuity and RSBAC ACL's
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2001 09:38:59 +0100
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On Die, 13 Mär 2001 john@mwk.co.nz wrote: > As I understand it, unix perms are tested first, then RSBAC perms. Thhe > result is the most restrictive set of permissions. > > Thus to use ACL's for a file server you must put 777 on the directories then > apply RSBAC ACL's. > > The problem is that some programs, sendmail, procmail and likely many > others, will test for security problems on directories. > They cant know about RSBAC and decide that world and group writeable > directories are a security failure. > > Procmail wont execute your procmailrc in your home directory in this case. > Sendmail complains also. > > Is there any way of changing this so that where RSBAC ACLs and unix perms > are applied, the RSBAC ACL's override the unix perms? First of all, RSBAC ACLs are always active and applied, if the decision code gets called. They might be inherited, but are always there. Even more, the decision code does not even see where the permission vector for a subject comes from - inheritance is part of the data structures. Only accumulation of user, group and role rights is done in the decision code. One solution would be to optionally disable Linux access control, with all risks, while still returning the existing access bits on sys_access. However, as you know, this is very dangerous, if RSBAC setup is not done very carefully. We could misuse the DAC_override Linux capability etc. and simply set them for marked programs, but this is also dangerous. Possibly a file attribute 'force_linux_caps' with a vector of caps, which is controlled by all modules. The advantage is that it only gets used, if RSBAC is active. The Linux setuid flag is probably also checked by the programs. If not, you could use that one for now. Bad solution if you ever plan to go back to kernels without RSBAC. Amon. - To unsubscribe from the rsbac list, send a mail to majordomo@rsbac.org with unsubscribe rsbac as single line in the body.
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