Re: NSA - Spook Linux

From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: NSA - Spook Linux
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2001 08:51:48 -0500 (EST)

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On Tue, 9 Jan 2001, Don wrote:

> Stephen Smalley <sds@tislabs.com> said:
> 
> > In comparison to traditional lattice-based models like BLP and Biba, Type
> > Enforcement is better suited to providing integrity protection, especially
> 
> I disagree. While forms of type enforcement are not the correct schema for
> an information flow model, there is surprising power in simply keeping
> compartments from interacting. My ramblings on the subject may be found at
> http://research-cistw.saic.com/cace/dte.html.

Perhaps my statement was unclear.  I was not suggesting the Type
Enforcement is limited to providing integrity protection, just
that its properties are especially useful in providing integrity
protection.  I agree that Type Enforcement is also useful in
enforcing confidentiality requirements.

--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
sds@tislabs.com

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